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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin"
and John E. Duvall**
Similar to the 2005 survey period, during the 2006 survey period, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals continued its trend of issuing fewer
and fewer published decisions in the area of employment discrimination.' The court issued only six published decisions all year involving
Title VII and only published nine opinions in the area of employment
discrimination overall. With respect to unpublished opinions, however,
the court continued to be extremely active, issuing 103 unpublished Title
VII opinions and 148 unpublished employment discrimination opinions
overall. This is further evidence of the fact that despite the proliferation
of employment discrimination cases before the court, there continue to
be fewer and fewer unsettled questions of law in this area. Clearly the
most significant opinion of the year was the Supreme Court's retaliation
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White,2 which
greatly expanded Title VII's anti-retaliation provision by holding that

Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
*
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2006. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)); the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2000));
and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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section 704(a) of the Acts is not limited to adverse employment actions
related to a plaintiff's employment or that occur at the workplace.

I.
A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Jurisdiction

1. Definition of "Employer." In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,4 the
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the numerical
limitation on the number of employees contained in Title VII's definition
of "employer"5 was a matter of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction or, rather, a substantive ingredient of the plaintiff's claim for
relief.6 The plaintiff had brought a Title VII action against her former
employer, Y & H Corporation, alleging sexual harassment. Following a
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$40,000. Two weeks after the trial, the employer filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, raising for the first time
that it had fewer than fifteen employees and thus was not covered by
Title VII. The district court, believing this to be a jurisdictional issue,
reluctantly granted the defendant's motion.' The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.'
The Supreme Court noted the broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction that Congress had given the federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 9
that is, "'all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.'" 10 The Court also noted the broad jurisdictional
provision contained in section 706(f)(3) of Title VII itself.' Noting that
its prior decisions on the issue of jurisdiction had been "less than
meticulous," 2 the Court unanimously held that "when Congress does

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
4. 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) defines "employer" as "a person.., who has 15 or more
employees."
6. Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1238.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1241.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
10. Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1239 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Section 1331 provides as
follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
11. Arbaugh, 126 S..Ct. at 1239 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2000)). Section 2000e5(f)(3) provides that district courts have jurisdiction over actions "brought under" Title VII.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
12. Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1242.
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not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." 3
Accordingly, the Court held that the threshold number of employees
contained in Title VII's definition of "employer" was an element of the
plaintiff's claim for relief and was not an issue of the trial court's subject
matter jurisdiction. 4
B.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

5
1. Individual Liability. In Dearth v. Collins,"
the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether an individual employee can be
held liable under Title VII.' The plaintiff had been the administrative
assistant to the defendant company's president and sole shareholder.
Following the plaintiff's termination, she brought an action under Title
VII alleging sexual harassment against both the company and the
president, individually. The district court granted summary judgment
for both defendants. 7 On appeal, the plaintiff, acknowledging the
Eleventh Circuit's prior decisions holding that supervisors of public
employers could not be held individually liable under Title VII,"
argued that harassing supervisors of private employers, in appropriate
circumstances, could be subject to liability under Title VII.'
In
rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit held:

To the extent that we have not so held before, we now expressly hold
that relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and
not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation of the Act, regardless20 of whether the employer is a public
company or a private company.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court.2 '

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
2000);
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1245.
Id.
441 F.3d 931 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933 (citing Hinson v. Clinch County Bd.of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (1lth Cir.
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Id.
Id. (citing Hinson, 231 F.3d at 827; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772).
Id. at 936.
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2. Disparate Treatment. In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,22 the
Supreme Court reversed the long-established standard utilized by the
Eleventh Circuit in discriminatory failure to promote cases under Title
VII. 2 3
The plaintiffs were two African-American superintendents
working at a poultry plant owned by Tyson Foods. The plaintiffs applied
for promotions to two open shift manager positions, but two white male
applicants were chosen for the positions instead. The plaintiffs brought
suit under Title VII and § 1981.24 Following a trial, a jury ruled for the
plaintiffs, but the district court granted the defendant's post-trial motion
for judgment. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court with
respect to one plaintiff, but reversed with respect to the other
25
plaintiff.
In vacating the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court focused
on two concerns. 2 1. First, the Court commented on the Eleventh
Circuit's characterization of the use of the term "boy."27 The Eleventh
Circuit had held that without additional evidence of discrimination, the
use of the term "boy" by itself was not evidence of discrimination.28
The Supreme Court held that although the use of the word "boy" will not
"always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term,
standing alone, is always benign."29 The Court continued that the
meaning of the use of the word would depend on "various factors
including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical
usage."3" Second, the Supreme Court addressed the Eleventh Circuit's
standard in failure to promote cases.3 ' In the past, the Eleventh
Circuit had concluded that pretext in such cases could only be established when the disparity in qualifications between the plaintiff and the
person selected was "'so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and
slap you in the face.'" 32 The Supreme Court commented that this
standard was "unhelpful and imprecise as an elaboration of the standard
for inferring pretext from superior qualifications."3" Although the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

126 S. Ct. 1195 (2006).
Id. at 1198.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000);Ash, 126 S. Ct. at 1196.
Ash, 126 S. Ct. at 1196.
Id. at 1197-98.
Id. at 1197.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1197-98.
Id. at 1197 (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Id.
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Court noted that it was not prepared to define what the standard should
be in such cases, 4 it was clear that the "jump off the page and slap you
in the face" standard was not it.3" The Court remanded the case to the
Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings."
In Brooks v. County Commission of Jefferson County, the Eleventh
Circuit had its first opportunity to address a Title VII failure to promote
case following the Supreme Court's decision in Ash. The plaintiff, a
white female, applied for promotion to the position of budget management officer for the defendant county. When the county selected Tracie
Hodge, a black female, for the position instead of the plaintiff (based in
part upon Hodge's prior experience serving as interim budget management officer), the plaintiff brought a race discrimination claim under
Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for the
county.3 "
On appeal, citing the decision in Ash as well as its own prior decision
in Cooper v. Southern Co.," the Eleventh Circuit held, with respect to
the issue of whether the county's selection of Hodge was based on
reasons that were a pretext for discrimination, that the plaintiff had not
met her burden of showing that "the disparities between her qualifications and Hodge's qualifications were so severe that no reasonable
person could have chosen Hodge over her."40 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.4 '
In Burke-Fowler v. Orange County,42 the Eleventh Circuit was
confronted with the familiar issue of whether alleged comparators were
"similarly situated" to the plaintiff; that is, that employees not in the
plaintiff's protected category engaged in similar misconduct as the
plaintiff but received more favorable disciplinary treatment.4 3 The
plaintiff worked as a correctional officer for the defendant County's
corrections department. A number of years after she was hired, the
plaintiff developed a relationship with and eventually married an inmate
at the prison. The plaintiff did not disclose either her relationship or
her marriage to her supervisors at the correctional facility. The County
maintained a policy prohibiting correctional officers from fraternizing

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
446 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1162.
390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005).
Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163.
Id. at 1164.
447 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1323.
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with inmates. When the plaintiff's supervisors found out about her
marriage, the plaintiff was terminated for violating the County's antifraternization policy. In the plaintiff's subsequent race discrimination
action pursuant to Title VII, the district court granted summary
judgment for the County."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned primarily with whether
the plaintiff had produced evidence of other "similarly situated" white
correctional officers who had received more favorable treatment." The
plaintiff had presented evidence of two white correctional officers who
established relationships with individuals who were incarcerated after
the relationships had begun but were not terminated." The court of
appeals noted that this was a critical difference when compared to the
plaintiff's case because the plaintiff had entered into her relationship
with full knowledge of the County's policy and with full knowledge of the
inmate's status as an inmate.47 Citing its prior decision in Maniccia v.
Brown," the court of appeals held that the misconduct of the alleged
comparators was not "'nearly identical'" to that of the plaintiff."
Accordingly, neither were deemed to be appropriate comparators, and
the district court's opinion was affirmed."°
3. Direct Evidence. In Tomczyk v. Jocks & Jills Restaurants,
LLC,5 l the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with the issue of what
constitutes direct evidence of discriminatory intent for purposes of a
Title VII claim.5 2 The plaintiff was an upper-management employee for
the defendant sports bar and restaurant chain. Following her termination, she brought, inter alia, a claim of race discrimination pursuant to
Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant.5"
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she had presented direct evidence
of the defendant's discriminatory intent: evidence that the defendant's
chairman of the board and controlling shareholder had used racial slurs
in describing her physical appearance and in characterizing her as
attractive to African-American men, which the plaintiff also argued was

44. Id. at 1322.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1325.
47. Id.
48. 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
49. Burke-Fowler,447 F.3d at 1325.
50. Id. at 1325-26.
51. 198 F. App'x 804 (11th Cir. 2006).
52. Id. at 808-09.
53. Id. at 805.
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sufficient to infer that the chairman found interracial relationships
repulsive.54 Citing its prior precedent that "'only the most blatant remarks'" would be deemed direct evidence of discriminatory intent,5 5 the
court of appeals affirmed.5" The court noted that the plaintiff did not
contend that the chairman had threatened to fire the plaintiff because
of her interracial relationship. 7 However, the court also noted that
there was evidence that the chairman had threatened to fire the plaintiff
if she continued to hire her boyfriend for the defendant's promotional
events.58 Noting that "[amny business has the right to insist on conflictfree decision making about the expenditure of its funds,"59 the Eleventh
Circuit concluded there was no direct evidence of discrimination."
4.
Religious Discrimination. In Richardson v. Dougherty
County,61 the Eleventh Circuit addressed a claim for religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII.6" The plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist,
served as a deputy with the Dougherty County Sheriff's Office.
According to the plaintiff's religious beliefs, he could not work on the
Sabbath, which lasted from sundown on Friday until sundown on
Saturday. The plaintiff requested that he not be required to work on the
Sabbath as an accommodation for his religious beliefs. In response, the
Sheriff's Office offered him the alternative accommodations of either
swapping shifts with another deputy or taking annual leave. Thereafter,
the plaintiff, along with several other deputies, was accused of sexual
misconduct with a female deputy while on duty. The plaintiff was
terminated following an investigation and then brought a Title VII
action alleging religious discrimination. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant.'
On appeal, the plaintiff initially argued that he had presented direct
evidence of discrimination when the defendant made the following
statement in response to his request for accommodation: "You want
every Saturday off. We're sick of this. I wish you would find another

54.
55.
2004)).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 810 (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
185 F. App'x 785 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 787.

1194

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

job."6 4
The plaintiff also presented evidence that the defendants
referred to him as a "preacher man," a "minister," and "too preachy."65
However, concluding that this evidence did not meet the "only the most
blatant remarks" standard for direct evidence, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the statements were merely circumstantial evidence. 6
The court of appeals also held that the plaintiff had failed to prove his
failure to accommodate claim.67 It was undisputed that the plaintiff
had not worked a single Sabbath after requesting his accommodation
and that the Sheriff's Office had offered him two alternative accommodations.6 Finally, because the plaintiff had presented no evidence that
employees outside of his protected class had been treated more favorably
than he had been treated, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision. 9
5. Retaliation. In the most noteworthy decision during the survey
period, the Supreme Court, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
v. White,7" addressed the scope of the retaliation provision 7 ' found in
section 704(a) of Title VII. 7 ' The plaintiff worked as a forklift operator
for the defendant railroad. During the course of her employment, the
plaintiff complained to the defendant's officials that her supervisor had
repeatedly told her that women should not be working in the railroad's
maintenance department. Although the supervisor was suspended and
ordered to attend sexual harassment training, the plaintiff was also
removed from her forklift duty and reassigned to perform only standard
track laborer tasks. The plaintiff brought a Title VII action alleging that
the reassignment of her duties was in retaliation for her complaint about
her supervisor. Following a trial, a jury entered a verdict in the
plaintiff's favor in the amount of $43,500. 7" On appeal, an initial Sixth
Circuit panel reversed the judgment, but after rehearing the case en
banc, the full court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.7 4

64. Id. at 788-89.
65. Id. at 789.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 789-90, 791.
70. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
71. Id. at 2409.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), an employer is
prohibited from discriminating against an employee because the employee has "opposed
any practice" made unlawful by Title VII or has "made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in" a Title VII proceeding. Id.
73. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409-10.
74. Id. at 2410.
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The Supreme Court addressed the defendant's argument that in order
to establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff had to show
an "'adverse employment action"' which constituted a "'materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions' of [the plaintiff's] employment."7 5 In concluding that the Act's retaliation provision was not
intended to be restricted in this manner, the Court stated that the "scope
of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or
employment-related retaliatory acts and harm."" The Court went on
to conclude as follows:
We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the
actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment
or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers
those (and only those) employer actions that would have been
materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the
present context that means that the employer's actions must be
harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.77
In clarifying what it meant by the term "material adversity," the Court
made it clear that employees complaining of discrimination "cannot
immunize [themselves] from those petty slights or minor annoyances
that often take place at work and that all employees experience. " "
Notwithstanding this limitation, it is anticipated that the decision in
Burlington will significantly increase the number of Title VII retaliation
claims that proceed to trial.
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

A.

Prima Facie Case
One noteworthy age discrimination decision rendered during the
survey period dealt with the issue of a plaintiff's prima facie case
burden. In Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.," the court of appeals
concluded, in an unpublished decision, that an employer's failure to give
an explanation for its discharge decision at the time it terminates an
employee could be used to demonstrate that the explanation eventually

75.

Id.

76. Id. at 2414.
77. Id. at 2409.
78. Id. at 2415 (citing 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 669 (3d ed. 1996)).
79. 196 F. App'x 773 (11th Cir. 2006).
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given was pretextual." When Mock was discharged from employment,
he insisted that Bell provide him with a reason for its decision. Bell
refused at the time, but later told him in writing that he had been
terminated for unacceptable job performance."1 The panel concluded
that this practice established pretext: "In light of Bell's refusal to tell
Mock-at the time it fired him-why his employment had come to an
end, a trier of fact reasonably could find that the letter constituted a
pretext for discrimination." 2 This decision could require practitioners
to reconsider the standard advice given to employers that no explanation
is required when discharging employees in an at-will situation.
B.

Direct Evidence

Two decisions attempted to better define direct evidence. In Roberts
v. Design & Manufacturing Services, Inc.," one panel wrestled with
what constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination. In the court
below, Roberts, the plaintiff, attempted to establish a direct evidence
case by pointing to certain statements made by a supervisor, Fitzgerald,
months before Roberts had been terminated from employment. The
district court determined the statements were not direct evidence. 4
The court of appeals likewise concluded that the statements were
ambiguous and affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment
to the defendants:
Because the alleged statements can be subject to more than one
interpretation, the district court did not err by concluding that Fitzgerald's comments were not direct evidence of employment age discrimination. Fitzgerald never stated that he was going to fire Roberts because
he was too old. All of the proffered statements, which were primarily
made months before Roberts was terminated, require inferential leaps
that Fitzgerald terminated Roberts due to his age, which, under the
law of this Circuit, is not direct evidence of employment discrimination."'
What makes the decision in Roberts noteworthy is the clearly agebased nature of the statements at issue. Roberts alleged that Fitzgerald
had told him he "was getting too old for this stuff' and "needed to spend
more time with [his] family and get back to playing golf" and that

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
1987)).

Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
167 F. App'x 82 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85 (citing Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 610-11 (11th Cir.
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Fitzgerald made "frequent" inquiries as to when Roberts was going to
"retire." 6
In the second interesting direct evidence case, Kincaid v. Board of
Trustees" a second panel also concluded that statements attributed to
persons in authority did not necessarily constitute direct evidence of age
discrimination as to the plaintiff."
"When determining whether a
statement is direct evidence of discrimination, we consider timing and
whether the person making the statement was a decisionmaker.""9 The
court of appeals determined the individuals making the statements were
not decisionmakers. 9° "Because Lawrence was the sole decisionmaker,
statements from other [defendant officials] did not constitute direct
evidence of discrimination."9 1
C.

Adverse Employment Action

In a decision handed down prior to the Supreme Court ruling in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,92 the Eleventh
Circuit in Apodaca v. Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security9 3 affirmed that "'not all conduct by an employer negatively
affecting an employee constitutes an adverse employment action"' for
purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.9 4
Burlington Northern is generally considered to have lowered the
standard for establishing materially adverse employment actions for
purposes of retaliation claims. Notwithstanding the sweeping language
of Burlington Northern, the Eleventh Circuit continues to rely on prior
precedent to the effect quoted above.95

86. Id. at 84.
87. 188 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2006).
88. Id. at 816.
89. Id. (citing Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir.
2002); Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095,
1107 (11th Cir. 2001)).
92. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
93. 161 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2006).
94. Id. at 900 (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.
2001)).
95. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Florida,245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001), is still relied
upon in the circuit for stating the proper standard that an adverse employment action
must be a material one before it is actionable under the discrimination laws, distinguishing
Burlington Northern as applying only in the retaliation context. See, e.g., Beard v. 84
Lumber Co., 206 F. App'x 852, 857 (2006).
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OWBPA Releases

In the only noteworthy published ADEA9 6 decision rendered during
the survey period, Burlison v. McDonald's Corp.,9 the Eleventh Circuit
provided practitioners with some useful instruction on compliance with
the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act's ("OWBPA") informational
requirements." In an interlocutory appeal, McDonald's Corporation
asserted that the district court had erroneously read the requirements
of OWBPA.99 Specifically, McDonald's Corporation argued that under
the district court's reading of the OWBPA, employers would be required
to provide departing employees with unhelpful information concerning
their circumstances."°
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, reversed the
district court, and entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 011
The court's discussion and analysis principally focused on the
definition of the phrase "decisional unit."'0 ° The phrase is critical for
determining the notifications required to be given to employees from
whom releases are being sought in typical reduction in force situations.
The decision is instructive in this regard and certainly is required
reading when practitioners are confronted with similar questions in the
future.
III.
A.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

EssentialJob Functions

In Bishop v. Georgia Department of Family & Children Services,0 3
the Eleventh Circuit rendered perhaps the most amusing decision
entered during the survey period. The district court had granted
summary judgment for the defendant, concluding that "'exercising good
judgment'" was an essential job function for the position of a Georgia

96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
97. 455 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2006).
98. The OWBPA amended the ADEA by, inter alia, imposing very specific requirements on releases in order for them to be effective as to ADEA claims. Pub. L. No. 101433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621,623, 626, & 630 (2000)).
The primary purpose of the OWBPA was to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
99. Burlison, 455 F.3d at 1244.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1249.
102. Id. passim.
103. No. 04-16695, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5968 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006).
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Department of Family and Children Services Economic Support
Supervisor." 4 Because of mental health issues, the plaintiff often
made "inappropriate statements, ha[d] inappropriate interactions with
other people, and exercise[d] poor judgment."10 5 Her employer concluded these behaviors made the plaintiff unable to perform the essential
functions of her job and discharged her for misconduct. 106
While observing that "[e]xercising some degree of good judgment is
arguably a function of every occupation," °7 the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that it might not necessarily be an essential function of this
particular job:
Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a
reasonable fact finder might infer from [the] record that [the plaintiff's
employer] did not really consider "exercising good judgment" to be an
essential function of Plaintiff's job. At the very least, a reasonable fact
finder might find that Plaintiff exhibited the degree of acuity and
consistency of judgment necessary to be a qualified person for the
specific job in this case. We accordingly conclude that sufficient
questions of fact exist such that summary judgment should not be
granted.0 8
The case was remanded to the district court for a factual determination
on the issue of whether exercising good judgment was indeed an
essential function of this particular job.'0 9
B.

Reasonable Accommodation

Three reasonable accommodation cases decided during the survey
period are worthy of comment. In Warren v. Volusia County,"' the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment for a
public employer, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to specifically
request a reasonable accommodation."' The case had been tried to a
jury, which found in favor of the employee. The defendant moved for
judgment as a matter of law, and the district court granted the
motion." 2 In so ruling, the district court found "that no reasonable
jury could have concluded that Warren requested a reasonable accommo-

104.

Id. at *4.

105. Id. at *2.
106.

Id. at *3, *4.

107. Id. at *7 (citing Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002)).
108. Id. at *8-9.
109. See id. at *10.
110.

188 F. App'x 859 (11th Cir. 2006).

111. Id. at 863.
112.

Id. at 861-62.
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dation."" 3 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, noting that Warren was
required to make a specific demand for accommodation and that an
attorney's statement during a workers' compensation settlement
conference did not constitute a specific enough request.""
Bishop v. Georgia Department of Family & Children Services"5 also
presented the court with a reasonable accommodation question. Again
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that her violations of her employer's policy
did not necessarily "render her unable to perform the essential functions
of her job with some reasonable accommodation."" 6 We anticipate that
we will be reporting on Bishop again at some future point given the
difficult accommodation issues presented.
Finally, at least with respect to reasonable accommodation questions,
Kinsey v. City of Jacksonville117 is instructive on an employer's obligation when an employee is not qualified to perform any other available
jobs. Kinsey suffered from hypertension, which made him unable to
perform the job for which he had been hired-a laborer in the City
Department of Public Works. Kinsey had been hired to work outdoors,
but his hypertension did not permit outdoor activity for any length of
time whenever the ambient temperature exceeded eighty degrees. His
employer advised him to search for other employment within the City
since he was no longer able to perform the job for which he had been
hired. Kinsey made some effort to locate other City employment but
failed to demonstrate that he was qualified to perform any other
available position with the City. Eventually, Kinsey resigned his
employment and this litigation ensued."' The district court granted
summary judgment to the City on Kinsey's reasonable accommodation
claim."' The court of appeals affirmed, noting that the City had made
several unsuccessful attempts to assign Kinsey to other positions. 2 °
Because Kinsey failed to qualify for any of those available positions, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed that the City had put forth legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for its employment actions. 2 '
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117.
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119.
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121.

Id. at 862.
Id. at 861, 863.
No. 04-16695, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5968, at *9-10 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006).
Id. at *10.
189 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 861-62.
Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 864.
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CML RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866 AND 1871

Section 1981

1.
Retaliation. In Tucker v. Talladega City Schools,'22 the
elements of a cause of action for retaliation under § 1981 were at
124
issue. 2 ' The elements of such actions are not well-established.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that a stand-alone action for retaliation
can be maintained under § 1981 and embraced the notion that the
elements of a § 1981 retaliation claim ought
to be the same as the
26
25
elements of a Title VII retaliation claim.1
B.

Section 1983
Garcetti v. Ceballos,'27 decided by the United States Supreme Court
on March 30, 2006, was certainly the most widely reported § 1983128
decision announced during the survey period. A sharply divided
Supreme Court issued a five-to-four decision. 129 The Court decided
that a public employee cannot bring a First Amendment claim based on
3
speech that the employee makes during the course of his job duties. 1
The majority held that job "duty speech" by government employees was
not protected under the First Amendment.'
The result of the
Garcetti decision is seen to be a significant narrowing of the scope of
First Amendment claims that may be maintained by public employees
under § 1983.32
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171 F. App'x 289 (11th Cir. 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); Id. at 294.

124. Tucker, 171 F. App'x at 294; see Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d
1405, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1120

n.10 (11th Cir. 2001).
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42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
171 F. App'x at 295-96.
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954.

130. Id. at 1962.
131. Id.
132. See Lynne Bernabei & Alan R. Kabat, Garcetti: Nine Months Later,How Have the
Federal CourtsAnalyzed 'Duty Speech' By Government Employees with FirstAmendment
Claims?, 45 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 264 (Feb. 27, 2007).
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In Battle v. Board of Regents for the State of Georgia,3 3 the Eleventh
3
Circuit panel applied Garcetti."
Concluding that the plaintiff's
retaliation claim failed under Garcetti, the court determined that Battle
had been functioning within her clear employment duty when she
encountered financial aid irregularities that she disclosed and subsequently claimed caused her to suffer retaliation. 3 ' Since her speech
involved "duty speech," Battle's retaliation claim failed.' 3 6
In Mitchell v. Hillsborough County,"7 the Eleventh Circuit held that
a public employee's "tasteless and vulgar ad hominem attack" on a
county commissioner during a public hearing was not protected
speech.' 3 8 It is interesting that Mitchell was commenting on the
matter under consideration by the county commission during a public
hearing when he made these attacks.3 9
V. CONCLUSION
The dearth of published opinions in the employment arena was very
noticeable during the survey period this year. The Authors were
required to rely more on unpublished opinions than published ones to
continue monitoring the trends in this area of decisional law.

133. 468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 760.
135. Id. at 761.
136. Id. at 761-62.
137. 468 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
138. Id. at 1286, 1289. While not necessarily as amusing as the "essential job function"
analysis required of the court of appeals in Bishop v. Georgia Department of Family &
Children Services, No. 04-16695, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5968 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006),
Mitchell's audacity to stand before a public meeting and to comment as he did, while on
the clock, cannot help but get a chuckle from the reader.
139. Id. at 1279.

